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Nexus on the Net: A Taxing Question
INTRODUCTION
The art of taxation consists in so plucking the goose as to get
the most feather with the least hissing.'
With increasing financial obligations, States are eager to develop
new sources of revenue.2 Ever inviting is the broadening of the
landscape of taxable transactions to include those transactions
extending beyond the State's physical borders. Although States
have had varied success in their efforts, Constitutional restraints
have continuously bridled their attempts to cover out-of-state
vendors with the blanket of State taxation.
This comment analyzes the taxation of sales made by out-of-state
vendors over the Internet to residents of the taxing State. The
question presented is whether a State may require an out-of-state
vendor to collect and remit a use tax on sales made to residents of
the taxing State based solely on the presence of a Web site
accessible from within the taxing State.3 Although this issue bears a
resemblance to the complexities inherent in the taxation of the
mail-order industry, Internet sales advance new uncertainties.4 It is
the position of the author that presently, States may not
constitutionally tax sales made by out-of-state vendors over the
Internet based solely on the presence of a Web site accessible from
1. JbAN BAPrmrE COLBErT, THE HARPER BooK OF QUOTATIONS 434 (Robert I. Fitzhenry ed.,
3d ed. 1993).
2. See R. Scot Grierson, Internet Symposium: Legal Potholes Along the Information
Superhighway, 16 Loy. LA ENT. L.J. 541, 572 (1996) ("Internet Symposium") (recognizing that
a fundamental purpose behind States striving to impose use tax collection and remittance
duties upon out-of-state vendors which make sales over the Internet is the imposition of
"unfunded [federal] mandates"). As of 1996, states and local governments generated
approximately $200 billion annually in sales and use taxes; 35% of their revenue-generating
potential. Id. at 573.
3. See National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 555
(1977) (recognizing that "not every out-of-state seller may constitutionally be made liable for
payment of [a] use tax on merchandise sold to purchasers in the [taxing] State").
4. See Karl A. Frieden & Michael E. Porter, The Taxation of Cyberspace: State Tax
Issues Related to the Internet and Electronic Commercer, 11 STATES TAx NoTES 1363, 1376
(1996) (recognizing that the "sales and use tax issues that arise as a result of electronic
catalogs or electronic advertisements are familiar ones").
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within the taxing State.
Part I of this comment provides a summary of sales and use
taxes, and concludes with an overview of the Internet. Part II
describes the relevant case law applicable to the taxation of
mail-order sales and the assertion of personal jurisdiction over an
out-of-state party due to the maintenance of a Web site. Part III
analyzes whether a State may require an out-of-state vendor to
collect and remit a use tax on sales made to residents of the taxing
State based solely on the presence of a Web site accessible from
within the taxing State. Part IV presents a concise conclusion.
I. HISTORY
A. Sales and Use Taxes
A "sales tax" is a tax imposed upon the sale of tangible property
and enumerated services within a State. 5 A "use tax," by distinction,
is a tax imposed on the "use, consumption, or storage of tangible
property within a State."6 Use taxes serve two primary functions:
(1) to protect a State's sales tax revenue;7 and (2) to protect
5. BLACK'S LAw DIcrIoNARY 1339 (6th ed. 1990). "Sales tax" is "[a] state or local-level tax
on the retail sale of specified property or services." Id. The tax is generally collected by the
seller or service-providers, although paid by the purchaser. Id. Pennsylvania imposes a sales
tax in 72 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7202(a). Section 7202(a) provides:
(a) There is hereby imposed upon each separate sale at retail of tangible personal
property or services, as defined herein, within this Commonwealth a tax of six per
cent of the purchase price, which tax shall be collected by the vendor from the
purchaser, and shall be paid over to the Commonwealth as herein provided. 72 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7202(a) (West 1990).
6. BLAcK's LAw DicTIoNARY 1543 (6th ed. 1990). The constitutionality of use taxes was
upheld in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 581 (1937) (upholding a tax imposed
on the use of machinery within the State of Washington). Pennsylvania imposes a use tax on
tangible personal property in 72 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7202(b). Section 7202(b) provides:
(b) There is hereby imposed upon the use, on and after the effective date of this
article, within this Commonwealth of tangible personal property purchased at retail on
or after the effective date of this article . . . a tax of six per cent of the purchase
price, which tax shall be paid to the Commonwealth by the person who makes such
use as herein provided, except that such tax shall not be paid to the Commonwealth
by such person where he has paid the tax imposed by subsection (a) of this section
or has paid the tax imposed by subsection (b) to the vendor with respect to such use.
72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7202(b) (West 1990). Section 7201(o) (1) defines the term "use" to
include "[tihe exercise of any right or power incidental to the ownership, custody or
possession of tangible personal property and shall include, but not be limited to
transportation, storage or consumption." 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 72, § 7201(o) (1). As the
Court in Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland recognized, "[tiaxation of sales or purchases and
taxation of use or possession of purchases are complementary and related but serve very
different purposes." Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 343 (1954).
7. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 343. The use tax "takes the form of a levy on the privilege
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in-state merchants "against out-of-state competition."8
Because States impose a use tax only upon items imported into
the taxing State, enforcement of a use tax poses significant
challenges for the taxing authority.9 Ordinarily, the taxing authority
must rely on the in-state purchaser to remit the appropriate use tax
when goods are imported into the taxing State. Due to the
administrative burden imposed upon the taxing State in assuring
compliance by the in-state purchaser, States impose the collection
duty upon the out-of-state vendor.10
of using property within the taxing State, which would have been subject to a sales tax had
it been purchased within the State." PAuL JAMES HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE
COMMERCE 162 (1953).
8. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 343. As a device to protect in-state merchants from
out-of-state vendors in States which do not impose a sales tax, use taxes have the "same
effect as a protective tariff becoming due not on purchase of the goods but at the moment
of bringing them into the taxing states." Id.
9. Id.
10. See National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 555
(1977) (recognizing that by requiring the out-of-state vendor to collect and remit the use tax,
"in economic consequence, it is identical with making [the vendor] pay a sales tax").
Pennsylvania attempts to impose upon out-of-state vendors such a collection duty in 72 Pa.
Cons. Star. § 7237(b). Section 7237(b) provides:
(1) Every person maintaining a place of business in this Commonwealth and selling or
leasing tangible personal property or services ... the sale or use of which is subject
to tax shall collect the tax from the purchaser or lessee at the time of making the sale
or lease, and shall remit the tax to the department.
(2) Any person required under this article to collect tax from another person, who
shall fail to collect the proper amount of such tax, shall be liable for the full amount
of the tax which he should have collected.
72 PA- CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 7237(b) (West 1990). Section 7201(b) defines the phrase
"maintaining a place of business" as that phrase is used in section 7237(b). Section 7201(b)
provides:
(1) Having or maintaining within this Commonwealth, directly or by a subsidiary, an
office, distribution house, sales house, warehouse, service enterprise or other place of
business, or any agent of general or restricted authority irrespective of whether the
place of business or agent is located here permanently or temporarily or whether the
person or subsidiary maintaining such place of business or agent is authorized to do
business within the Commonwealth; or
(2) The engaging in any activity as a business within this Commonwealth by any
person, directly or by a subsidiary, in connection with the lease, sale or delivery of
tangible personal property or the performance of services thereon for use, storage or
consumption or in connection with the sale or delivery for use of the services
described in subclauses (11) through (18) of clause (k) of this section, including, but
not limited to, having, maintaining or using any office, distribution house, sales house,
warehouse or other place of business, any stock of goods or any solicitor, salesman,
agent or representative under its authority, at its direction or with its permission,
regardless of whether the person or subsidiary is authorized to do business in this
Commonwealth.
(3) Regularly or substantially soliciting orders within this Commonwealth in
connection with the lease, sale or delivery of tangible personal property to or the
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B. The Internet
The Internet has been defined as a "network of networks."1 It
comprises a myriad of interconnected networks.' 2 As of the end of
1996, commentators estimated that approximately forty million
people utilized the Internet, with the potential to exceed
200,000,000 by the turn of the century.13 Considering the current
growth rate of Internet use, it is expected that the entire global
population will have access to the Intemet by the year 2004.'
4 With
performance thereon of services or in connection with the sale or delivery of the
services described in subclauses (11) through (18) of clause (k) of this section for
residents of this Commonwealth by means of catalogues or other advertising, whether
such orders are accepted within or without this Commonwealth.
(4) The term "maintaining a place of business in this Commonwealth" shall not
include:
(i) Owning or leasing of tangible or intangible property by a person who has
contracted with an unaffiliated commercial printer for printing, provided that:
(A) the property is for use by the commercial printer, and
(B) the property is located at the Pennsylvania premises of the
commercial printer.
(ii) Visits by a person's employes or agents to the premises in this
Commonwealth of an unaffiliated commercial printer with whom the person
has contracted for printing in connection with said contract.
72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7201(b) (West 1990 & Supp. 1997). Subclauses (11) through (18) of
clause (k) concern the performance of services. See 72 cPa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 7201(k)
(11)-(18) (Supp. 1997).
11. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996),
aff'd., 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). A "network" is defined as a group of connected computers.
ACLU, 929 E Supp. at 830. The Internet may be analyzed on several different levels. Daniel
A. Tauber and Brenda Kienane have written:
At its most basic level, you can think of the Internet as a vast collection of even
vaster libraries of information, all available on-line for you to look at or retrieve and
use. At another level, the Internet might be thought of as the computers that store the
information and the networks that allow you to access the information on the
computers. And finally (lest we forget who made the Internet what it is today), it is a
collection of people - people who act as resources themselves, willing to share their
knowledge with the world.
DANIEL A. TAUBER & BRENDA KIENANE, SURFING THE INTERNET wTH NETScAPE NAVIGATOR 36 (3RD
ED. 1996) (EMPHASIS IN ORIGINAL).
12. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831. The connections between the various networks allow
each computer in the network to communicate with computers in that network or any other
network. Id. In this sense, the Internet is similar to a highway. TAUBER, supra note 11, at 7.
"High-speed data paths, called backbones, connect the major networks; these actually do
function much like an electronic version of the interstate highways. Through lower-speed
links, local networks tie in to the Internet, much as city streets feed onto highways." Id.
(emphasis in origninal).
13. ACLU, 929 F Supp. at 831. The court in ACLU noted that from 1981 to 1996, the
number of computers connected to the Internet increased from 300 to an astounding
9,400,000. Id.
14. TAUBER, supra note 11, at 12.
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such growth, the Internet has become an international
phenomenon.1'
Two methods commonly employed to access the Internet are: (1)
the use of a computer directly linked to a network linked to the
Internet; and (2) the use of a personal computer and a "modem" to
connect to a computer linked to the Internet. 16 Personal computer
users commonly access the Internet through a national
"commercial on-line service."17 Commercial on-line services provide
the user with a nationwide network that permits the user to access
the Internet by dialing a local telephone number.8 As of 1996,
approximately 12,000,000 people subscribed to commercial on-line
services. 9
Information exchange is the essence of the Internet. Information
may be exchanged over the Internet in numerous ways, most
commonly through "remote information retrieval."20 Moreover, users
15. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831. The Internet is not governed by an exclusive entity. Id.
at 832. The ACLU court noted that the Internet
[E]xists and functions as a result of the fact that hundreds of thousands of separate
operators of computers and computer networks independently decided to use
common data transfer protocols to exchange communications and information with
other computers (which in turn exchange communications with still other computers).
• . . there is no centralized storage location, control point, or communications channel
for the Internet, and it would not be technically feasible for a single entity to control
all of the information conveyed over the Internet.
Id.
16. Id. By using a modem, a remote computer is able to utilize the phone lines in
order to communicate with a computer that is connected to the Internet. DANIEL P. DERN, THE
INTERNET GumE FOR NEW USERs 5 (1994). A "modem" converts the electrical signals that
computers utilize in communicating into tones that may be transmitted over telephone lines.
Id.
17. ACLU, 929 F Supp. at 832. One must distinguish between "commercial on-line
services" and "Internet service providers." Traditionally, the difference between the two has
been that commercial on-line services provide "their own selected and specially developed
content to their subscribers- perhaps including Internet access as one of the services they
provide." TAUBER, supra note 11, at 322. Some of the most popular commercial on-line
services are Microsoft Network, Prodigy, CompuServe and America On-line. ACLU, 929 F
Supp. at 833. "Before the Internet became a viable option, these and other services were the
primary destination of the modem user who wanted to tap into extensive text databases,
retrieve stock quotes, make computerized airline reservations, or join worldwide discussion
groups." PAUL GILSTER, THE NEW INTERNET NAVIGATOR 78 (1995). Although Internet service
providers enable users to access the Internet, they do not provide content. Id.
18. ACLU, 929 F Supp. at 833. "CompuServe, for example, manages its huge user base
through a centralized set of computers. When you call in to local telephone numbers around
the world to gain access to the system, you are connecting ultimately to a centralized set of
resources." GnsTER, supra note 17, at 22.
19. ACLU, 929 F Supp. at 833.
20. Id. at 834. The most widely recognized methods of information exchange include:
"(1) one-to-one messaging (such as "e-mail"), (2) one-to-many messaging (such as "listserv"),
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typically conduct remote information retrieval via the "World Wide
Web" ("Web").
21
The Web is designed to allow people and organizations
throughout the world to communicate by use of shared
information. 22 After information has been "published"23 on the Web,
users may utilize numerous systems to search the many Web sites.
24
(3) distributed message databases (such as "USENET newsgroups"), (4) real time
communication (such as "Internet Relay Chat"), (5) real time remote computer utilization
(such as "telenet"), (6) and remote information retrieval (such as "ftp," "gopher," and the
"World Wide Web")." Id. "Remote information retrieval" is defined as "the search for and
retrieval of information located on remote computers." Id. at 835.
21. Id. at 836. The Web, which is presently the "most advanced information system
developed on the Internet," consists of a series of documents stored in numerous computers.
Id. The Web permits users to "use the network in an intuitive, logical environment." GUMsrfa,
supra note 17, at 461. As of 1995, approximately 30,000 Web sites were accessible, with a
monthly increase of twenty per cent. Id. at 20. Although the information on the Web is
stored in computers located throughout the world, "the fact that each of these computers is
connected to the Internet through [World Wide Web] protocols allows all of the information
to become part of a single body of knowledge." ACLU, 929 E Supp. at 836.
22. ACLU, 929 F Supp. at 836. The Web utilizes a formatting language called hypertext
markup language ("HTML"). Id. "Unlike regular documents, with static information on every
page, .hypertext documents have links built in so that readers can jump to more information
about a topic by (typically) simply clicking on the word or picture identifying the item."
TAUBER, supra note 11, at 18 (emphaisi in original). As Gilster describes it, "It's the
difference between a typewritten document and a printed magazine." GnsrER, supra note 17,
at 461.
23. ACLU, 929 F Supp. at 837. When a person or organization wishes to make
information available on the Web, the person or organization "publishes" the information in
accordance with Web standards. Id. In order to publish, the publisher either must connect to
the Internet with a computer that utilizes Web software, or "lease disk storage space from
someone else who has the necessary computer facilities." Id. After the organization
publishes the information, it is said to have created a "Web site." TAUBER, supra note 11, at
157. This Web site may contain one or numerous pages. Id. The main page of this collection
of pages is referred to as the Web site's "home page." Id. Gilster defines "home page" as
"simply [an] entryway[] into a particular collection of information at a given site." GaSrER,
supra note 17, at 461. Whether the Web site contains one or several pages, these pages
traditionally contain hypertext that permit the user to link to other sites by merely clicking
the mouse on the desired word or image. Id.
24. ACLU, 929 F Supp. at 837. In order to view Web pages, computers utilize
programs called "browsers." TAUBER, supra note 11, at 23. A browser is a "program with
which you can view graphically intriguing, linked documents all over the world and search
and access information in a few quick mouse-clicks." Id. A browser connects with the
computer that contains the desired information, reads the relevant files, and displays the
desired information on the user's computer. Id. Various browsers are on the market; the two
most popular are Netscape Navigator and Microsoft Explorer.
To actually search the Web, browsers utilize programs commonly referred to as "search
engines." Id. at 156. Some of the more popular search engines include AltaVista, Excite,
Lycos, Magellan, Web Crawler, and Yahoo. Id. at 169-96. Search engines permit users to
search the Web for sites that relate to a desired topic. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 837. The user
enters the topic and related descriptive words in the search field, the search engine searches
through the many data bases, and provides the user with a list of relevant Web sites as well
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Like the Internet, no centralized organization governs the use of, or
membership in, the Web.
25
The Web offers its users versatility as well as easier, less
expensive access to the Internet. These features have fostered a
growing interest in the Web among businesses. 26 An estimated
$29,000,000,000 worth of business will be conducted on-line in
1998.27
II. RELEVANT CASE LAW
A. Taxation of Mail-Order Sales
The Supreme Court of the United States has long "limit[ed] the
authority of a State to assess or impose a duty to collect taxes
arising out of the economic activity of a foreign business engaged
in interstate commerce."28 The constitutional limitations imposed on
this authority derive from two sources: (1) the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
(the "Due Process Clause"); and (2) the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution.29 Though the application of these
provisions to the issue of taxation of multi-state transactions were
once similar in nature, they have evolved into two distinct
as a hyperlink to each site. Gusmre, supra note 17, at 483.
25. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 838. As Paul Gilster illustrates, "The Internet is not
CompuServe or Prodigy. Lacking any central organization, the network has no billing
address. You can't make a phone call to a network office and say, 'Sign me up.'" GIIrER,
supra note 17, at 71.
26. GIISTER, supra note 17, at 587. Gilster notes that the "combination of typeset
quality formatting along with graphics and linkages to resources like sound and moving
video has proven irresistible to marketers." Id.
27. Michael Higgins, Forecast: Hot Spell to Continue, 84 A.BAJ. 44, 48 (1998). It is
further predicted that in 1998, approximately 545,000,000 pages of information will comprise
the Web. Id.. Moreover, it is estimated that the Web will be utilized by approximately
71,000,000 people in 1998. Id.
28. Orvis v. New York, 654 N.E.2d 954, 956 (N.Y. 1995).
29. Orvis, 654 N.E.2d at 956. The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process Clause as applied to the current situation is
referred to as the "jurisdiction to tax," or the "taxing power," of a State. Orris, 654 N.E.2d at
956. Article I provides that "Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONSr. art. I.,
§ 8, cls. 1, 3.
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evaluations.
1. Due Process Clause
The Supreme Court of the United States first addressed a State's
attempt to force an out-of-state vendor to collect a use tax on sales
made to residents of the taxing state in Miller Bros. Co. v.
Maryland.30 In Miller, Maryland attempted to require a Delaware
store to collect a Maryland use tax 31 on sales made to Maryland
residents.32 Applying the Due Process Clause, the Court concluded
that "due process requires some definite link, some minimum
connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction
it seeks to tax."S
Maryland did not have the "minimum connection" with the
Delaware store; the Delaware store did not, "by its acts or course
of dealing ... subject[] itself to the taxing power of Maryland," nor
had it "afforded [Maryland] a jurisdiction or power to create [the
vendor's] liability."34 Although the Court recognized that the
30. 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
31. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 341, n. 1. The Maryland use tax statute provided, "An
excise tax is hereby levied and imposed on the use, storage or consumption in this State of
tangible personal property purchased from a vendor within or without this State on or after
the effective date of this Act, for use, storage or consumption within this State." 81 MD. CODE
ANN. § 369 (Flack's 1951).
32. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 341 n. 2. The Maryland statute required that:
Every vendor engaging in business in this State and making sales of tangible personal
property for use, storage or consumption in this State which are taxable under the
provisions of this sub-title, at the time of making such sales, or if the use, storage or
consumption is not then taxable hereunder, at the time when such use, storage or
consumption becomes taxable hereunder, shall collect the tax imposed by this
sub-title from the purchaser.
81 MD. CODE ANN. § 371 (FLACK'S 1951). THE STATUTE FURTIER DEFINED THE DUTIES OF VENDORS
ENGAGED IN BUSINESS IN MARYLAND. Id.
33. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 34445. The Delaware store's sole place of business was
its store in Wilmington, Delaware. Id. at 341. The store took neither telephone nor mail
orders and did not employ agents to seek sales within Maryland. Id.
34. Id. at 34447. Maryland argued that the connection between itself and the
Delaware store was sufficient to require the Delaware store to collect and remit the use tax
to Maryland on purchases made by Maryland residents. Id. at 341-42. Maryland based its
argument on: "(1) the vendor's advertising with Delaware papers and radio stations, though
not especially directed to Maryland inhabitants, reached, and was known to reach, their
notice; (2) its occasional sales circulars mailed to all former customers included customers
in Maryland; (3) it delivered some purchases to common carriers consigned to Maryland
addresses; (4) it delivered other purchases by its own vehicles to Maryland locations." Id. at
34142.
The Court concluded that the Delaware store had not exploited or invaded the market in
Maryland. Id. at 347. Rather, the sales occurred solely as a result of Maryland residents
traveling to the Delaware store to make the purchases. Id. Because the Court concluded that
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Maryland residents incurred a use tax liability by importing goods
into the State, the Court refused to impose the burden of collection
on the out-of-state vendor.35
In Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, the Supreme Court significantly
lessened the degree of contact an out-of-state vendor must have
with the taxing State before the State may compel the vendor to
collect a use tax on sales made to residents of the taxing State.36
Scripto, Inc. ("Scripto"), was a Georgia corporation that sold
mechanical writing instruments to residents of Florida37 To
facilitate these sales, Scripto contracted with "advertising specialty
brokers" who merely solicited sales within Florida on behalf of
Scripto.38 The orders were accepted after their approval by
Scripto's Atlanta office.39 Scripto had no regular employees or
agents within the State of Florida, nor did they have any other
physical presence within the State.4°
Florida argued that the solicitation by Scripto's ten brokers
within the State permitted the State to compel Scripto to collect a
use tax on all sales made to Florida residents.41 The Court followed
its reasoning in Miller in holding that Florida could constitutionally
require Scripto to collect a use tax on sales made to Florida
residents only if the requisite connection existed between Florida
and the taxed transaction.42 The Court concluded that Florida
satisfied this requirement.4 In making its determination, the Court
gavegreat weight to the broker's "continuous local solicitation"
the Maryland use tax as applied to the Delaware store violated the Due Process Clause, it
did not entertain the possibility that it might also violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Id.
35. Id. at 347.
36. 362 U.S. 207 (1960), overruled in part by Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298
(1992). Commentators have often cited Scripto as the furthest extension of Due Process
jurisprudence with respect to use tax collection duties. See National Bellas Hess v. Dep't of
Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 757 (1967) (noting that Scripto "represents the furthest constitutional
reach to date of a State's power to deputize an out-of-state retailer as its collection agent").
37. Scripto, 362 U.S. at 207-08.
38. Id. at 209. These "advertising specialty brokers" were also referred to as
"wholesalers" and "jobbers." Id. The brokers were independent contractors; employed "for
the purpose of attracting, soliciting and obtaining Florida customers." Id. At the time in
question, Scripto contracted for the services of ten such brokers. Id.
39. Id. If the sale was accepted upon receipt of the order, the sale would be
consummated in Atlanta, Georgia. Id.
40. Id. at 208-09. Scripto did not "own, lease, or maintain any office, distributing
house, warehouse or other place of business in Florida." Id.
41. Id. at 207-08.
42. Scripto, 362 U.S. at 210-11.
43. Id. at 211.
1998
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within Florida.u The Court also focused upon the "nature and
extent" of Scripto's actions within Florida.4 5 Unlike in Miller, the
Court found that Florida fulfilled the constitutional requirements
and, therefore, upheld the collection requirement.
46
The Supreme Court further refined its due process analysis in
National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue.47 In Bellas Hess,
the State of Illinois sought to compel a Missouri mail-order
business to collect and remit to Illinois a use tax on sales made to
Illinois residents. 48 Bellas Hess argued that the Illinois collection
requirement unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce and
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
49
The Court recognized that the Due Process Clause demands
"some definite link, some minimum connection, between a State
and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.
"50
Furthermore, the Court noted the absence of precedent that would
permit a taxing State to compel collection of a use tax by an
out-of-state vendor based solely on the vendor's delivery of items
into the taxing State by either common carrier or the United States
mail 5
The Bellas Hess Court emphasized the difference between those
mail-order businesses that have "retail outlets, solicitors, or
44. Id. The Court noted that other than the mere act of acceptance which occurred in
Atlanta, the majority of the sales transaction occurred within Florida. Id. Furthermore, the
Court declined to distinguish between regular employees and independent contractors. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. 212-13.
47. 386 U.S. 753 (1967), overruled in part by Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298
(1992).
48. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 754.
49. Id. at 756.
50. Id. (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)).
51. Id. at 758. National Bellas Hess was a mail-order company which had as its
principal place of business in North Kansas City, Missouri. Id. at 753-54. As the Illinois
Supreme Court summarized:
[National Bellas Hess] does not maintain in Illinois any office, distribution house, sales
house, warehouse or any other place of business; it does not have in Illinois any
agent, salesman, canvasser, solicitor or other type of representative to sell or take
orders, to deliver merchandise, to accept payments, or to service merchandise it sells;
it does not own any tangible property, real or personal, in Illinois; it has no telephone
listing in Illinois and it has not advertised its merchandise for sale in newspapers, on
billboards, or by radio or television in Illinois.
National Bellas Hess v. Dep't of Revenue, 214 N.E.2d 755, 757 (1966). The sole contacts
between Illinois and Bellas Hess were use of the United States mail and common carriers.
Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 754. Bellas Hess periodically mailed catalogues and "flyers" to
customers throughout the nation, including Illinois. Id. Furthermore, orders were shipped
from the Missouri plant to customers throughout the nation, including Illinois, by either
common carrier or United States Mail. Id. at 755.
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property" within the taxing state, and those which "do no more
than communicate with customers in the State by mail or common
carrier as part of a general interstate business."52 The Court noted
that if it were to uphold the Illinois use tax as applied to National
Bellas Hess, the result would have national implications for all
mail-order companies.4 The Court, therefore, refused to uphold the
tax.54
The Supreme Court departed from precedent and overruled the
physical presence requirement of the Due Process Clause in QuiU
Corp. v. North Dakota.55 In Quill, North Dakota attempted to
require a mail-order business with warehouses in Illinois, Georgia,
and California to collect and remit a use tax imposed by North
Dakota on the purchase of products for use within North Dakota.56
The Court noted that the Due Process Clause requires a connection
between the taxing state and the subject of its taxation. 57 However,
the Court also recognized that the Court's due process
jurisprudence had evolved in the period following Bellas Hess.58
Focusing on the "minimum contacts" requirement of due process
jurisprudence,59 the Court concluded that it no longer applied a
52. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758. The Court "declined to obliterate" this distinction. Id.
53. Id. at 759. The Court concluded that if it permitted Illinois to obligate Bellas Hess
to collect the Illinois use tax, then "so can every other State, and so, indeed, can every
municipality, every school district and every other political subdivision throughout the
Nation with power to impose sales and use taxes. Id. Such a result would entail
"unjustifiable local entanglements." Id. at 760.
54. Id. at 759-60. Bellas Hess argued that the Illinois use tax violated its rights under
both the Fourteenth Amendment and the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 756. In reviewing
Bellas Hess' allegations, the Court noted that "the test whether a particular state exaction is
such as to invade the exclusive authority of Congress to regulate trade between the States,
and the test for a State's compliance with the requirements of due process in this area are
similar." Id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court applied a single test to the facts of Bellas Hess.
Id.
55. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
56. Quill, 504 U.S. at 301. Quill solicited business "through catalogs and flyers,
advertisements in national periodicals, and telephone calls." Id. at 302. Furthermore, Quill
had annual sales of $200,000,000, of which $1,000,000 were made to Quill's 3,000 North
Dakota customers. Id. All deliveries to North Dakota customers were made by either the
United States mail or common carrier. Id.
57. Id. at 306 (citing Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 34445 (1954)).
58. Id. at 307. In National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue, 214 N.E.2d 755
(1966), the Court suggested that some type of physical presence within the taxing state was
necessary for jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 306-07.
59. Contemporary due process jurisprudence originated in the landmark case of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Since International Shoe, the
Court has "framed the relevant inquiry as whether a defendant had minimum contacts with
the jurisdiction 'such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice".'" Id. at 307 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
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"formalistic" test,60 but examined, instead, the "reasonableness" of
the vendor's contacts with the taxing State.61 Accordingly, once an
out-of-state vendor has "engaged in continuous and widespread
solicitation of business within a State," it matters not that the
out-of-state vendor has no physical presence in the taxing State.62
The Quill Court thus overruled prior cases that demanded physical
presence within the taxing State to satisfy due process
requirements.6
2. Personal Jurisdiction Based on Maintenance of a Web Site
The power of a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over an
out-of-state party based solely on the maintenance of a Web site
accessible from within the court's jurisdiction greatly contributes to
the present discussion. Whether a court has the power to exercise
such personal jurisdiction has not been resolved.64 As States
(1940) (emphasis added)). If the defendant had "minimum contacts" with the forum State
such that it was reasonable to require the defendant to defend suit in that State, due process
requirements were satisfied.
When determining whether suit in the forum State was reasonable, the Court would weigh
the burden of defending suit in that forum, as well as "the forum state's interest in
adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, at
least when that interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiff's right to choose the
forum; the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies; and the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies." World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1985) (citations omitted).
60. Quil, 504 U.S. at 307. The Court recognized that it no longer required an actual
physical presence within a State seeking to exercise judicial jurisdiction. Id.; See Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (holding that personal jurisdiction is proper
where a "commercial actor" has "purposefully directed" his activities toward a State's
residents even though the "commercial actor" has no physical contacts with that State).
Rather, the Court applied a more flexible approach which examined the reasonableness of
requiring a defendant to defend suit in that jurisdiction. Quil, 504 U.S. at 307.
61. Quil, 504 U.S. at 307.
62. Id. at 308. The Court opined that, in "'modem commercial life,' it matters little
that such solicitation is accomplished by a deluge of catalogs rather than a phalanx of
drummers." Id.
63. Id. The Court concluded that Quill had "purposefully directed" its resources
toward residents of North Dakota, that the due process requirement of sufficient contacts
between Quill and North Dakota was satisfied, and that the use tax was sufficiently related
to the benefits that access to the market in North Dakota provided to Quill. Id.
64. Compare McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1826 (S.D. Cal. 1996)
(finding that the maintenance of a Web site on the Internet was not sufficient to constitute
"minimum contacts") with Inset Systems, Inc.. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F Supp. 161, 162
(D. Conn. 1996) (holding that the maintenance of a Web site accessible from within the
jurisdiction seeking to exercise personal jurisdiction was sufficient under due process
jurisprudence).
Nexus on the Net
struggle to apply traditional laws to this emerging concern, courts
are faced with complex new variants on familiar themes.
The Supreme Court of the United States has not addressed the
extension of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state party based
solely on the existence of a Web site on the Internet. However,
several federal and state courts have confronted the issue. In Inset
Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.,65 Inset Systems, a
Connecticut corporation, brought an action against Instruction Set
("ISI"), a Massachusetts corporation, for infringement of a
trademark.6 Advancing the argument that Connecticut lacked
personal jurisdiction, ISI sought a motion to dismiss.
67
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
recognized that due process jurisprudence requires "that a
nonresident corporate defendant have 'minimum contacts' with the
forum state such that it would reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there."6 Moreover, the court noted that "maintenance of
the suit in the forum state cannot offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."69 The court concluded that ISI
intentionally directed its resources toward Connecticut.76
Furthermore, ISI's Internet advertisements were continuously
accessible by Connecticut residents. Thus the court held that ISI
"should have foreseen the possibility of being subjected to suit in
Connecticut."
71
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California refused to exercise personal jurisdiction over an
out-of-state corporation based solely on the maintenance of a Web
65. 937 F Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
66. Inset, 937 E Supp. at 162.
67. Id. ISI sought a dismissal of the action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3). Id.
68. Id. at 164 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980)). The court further noted that the concept embodied in the "minimum contacts" test
is "that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws." Id. at 164-65 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
69. Id. (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
70. Id. at 165.
71. Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 162. ISI did not regularly engage in business in Connecticut,
nor did they have an office or any employees in the State of Connecticut. Id. at 162-63.
However, ISI advertised within Connecticut not only via a toll-free number, but also over the
Internet. Id. at 165. The court concluded that this advertising was directed towards the
entire country, including Connecticut. Id. The court noted that ISI could reach as many as
10,000 residents of Connecticut over the Internet. Id. at 165. Unlike print media and radio
advertisements that are "disposed of quickly," Internet advertisements, once posted, "are
available to Internet users continually, at the stroke of a few keys of a computer." Id. at 163.
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site in McDonough v. FaUon McEligott, Inc.72 McDonough was a
professional photographer residing in Encinitas, California.7" Fallon
McElligott, Inc. ("McElligot") was an advertising agency with its
principle place of business in Minneapolis, Minnesota.74 Advancing
the argument that California had the power to exercise personal
jurisdiction over McElligott, McDonough pointed to a Web site
maintained in California by McElligott.75 The court concluded that
maintenance of a Web site on. the Internet was insufficient to
constitute "minimum contacts."76 Consequently, the court flatly
rejected the possibility that maintenance of a Web site would
suffice to establish general personal jurisdiction 77  over an
out-of-state party.78
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri based a finding of personal jurisdiction in part on the
maintenance of a Web site in Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc.79 In
Cybergold, Maritz brought an action against Cybergold alleging
unfair competition and trademark infringement with respect to its
Internet activities.80 Maritz argued that Cybergold's maintenance of
a Web site, and the use of the site to solicit customers within
Missouri, sufficed to grant Missouri the authority to exercise
72. 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1826 (S.D. Cal. 1996). McDonough brought actions for unfair
competition, trademark infringement, invasion of privacy and right of publicity. McDonough,
40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1827.
73. Id. at 1827.
74. Id. McElligott had clients throughout the world, but none in California Id. at 1828.
Furthermore, McElligott had no office in California, no bank accounts in the State, did not
pay any taxes to California, and did not have any permanent employees in California,
although they had employed ifidependent contractors based in California at times. Id.
75. Id. at 1828.
76. Id.
77. "General personal jurisdiction" is obtained when "the Defendant's activities in the
state are 'substantial' or 'continuous and systematic.'" Id. at 1828 (citing Data Disc, Inc. v.
Systems Tech. Ass'n., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977)). In contrast, "specific personal
jurisdiction" is obtained "if a plaintiffs cause of action arises out of a specific forum-related
activity or event." Id. (citing Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 E2d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 1993)).
78. McDonough, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1828. The court concluded that "[b]ecause the Web
enables world-wide access, allowing computer interaction via the web to supply sufficient
contacts to establish jurisdiction would eviscerate the personal jurisdiction requirement as it
currently exists. . . ." Id. The court refused to take such action. Id.
79. 947 F Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
80. Cybergold, 947 F Supp. at 1329. Cybergold's Web site was "continually accessible
to every Intemet-connected computer in Missouri and the world." Id. at 1330. The site made
available to users information about Cybergold's proposed advertising service. Id. Though the
Web site was operational, the advertising service was not yet available. Id. The court noted
that Cybergold's Web site had been accessed from within Missouri approximately 131 times.
Id. Absent the Web site, Cybergold had no other contacts with Missouri. Id.
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personal jurisdiction over Cybergold.8 1 Cybergold filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that the Missouri court lacked personal
jurisdiction.82
The court recognized that the Internet posed unique due process
problems regarding the exercise of personal jurisdiction.83 In
deciding Cybergold's motion, the court applied a five-part test,
developed by the Eighth Circuit for measuring minimum contacts,
which consisted of the following factors: "(1) the nature and quality
of the contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity of those
contacts; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts; (4)
the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its
residents; and (5) the convenience of the parties."4 The court
opined that the number of times the Web site was accessed from
within Missouri, in addition to Cybergold's purpose in maintaining
the Web site, evidenced an intention on behalf of Cybergold to avail
itself of the privileges of conducting business in Missouri.8 5
Therefore, the court denied Cybergold's motion.8 6
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
81. Id. Maritz argued that Cybergold's Web site served as a "statewide advertisement."
Id. Maritz also argued that the Web site permitted Cybergold to actively solicit residents of
Missouri. Id.
82. Id. Cybergold sought to dismiss Maritz's claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 1329.
83. Id. at 1332. The court opined that the Internet was an "entirely new means of
information exchange" and, therefore, not sufficiently analogous to cases involving telephone
and mail use with respect to "determining whether [Cybergold] had 'purposefully availed'
itself of this forum." Id. The court reasoned:
"Unlike use of the mail, the Internet, with its electronic mail, is a tremendously more
efficient, quicker, and vast means of reaching a global audience. By simply setting up,
and posting information at, a website in the form of an advertisement or solicitation,
one has done everything necessary to reach the global internet [sic] audience." Id.
Although a toll-free telephone number requires publication, the court noted that users
can search the Internet and locate many desired Web sites. Id. Even though the
Internet utilizes telephone lines to communicate information, the Court opined that
the Internet is a more efficient and effective manner of reaching a global audience. Id.
at 1332-33.
84. Id. at 1332 (quoting Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. U.S. Kids, Inc., 22 F.3d 816, 819 (8th
Cir. 1994)).
85. Cybergold, 947 E Supp. at 1334. The court concluded that "[t]hrough its website,
Cybergold ha[d] consciously decided to transmit advertising information to all Internet users,
knowing that such information w[ould] be transmitted globally." Id. at 1333. Though the
court determined that the maintenance of the Web site constituted sufficient contact with the
State of Missouri, the court recognized that the contacts were of "a very new quality and
nature for personal jurisdiction jurisprudence." Id. The court also found that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over Cybergold did not offend "traditional notions of 'fair play and
substantial justice.'" Id. at 1334.
86. Id. at 1337.
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York in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 87 declined to exercise
personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation whose sole
contact with New York was the maintenance of a Web site
accessible by residents of New York.8 In Bensusan, a New York
corporation brought suit against a Missouri corporation alleging
unfair competition, trademark dilution, and infringement8 9 Richard
King ("King"), moved to dismiss the action, arguing that the New
York court lacked personal jurisdiction.90
Bensusan argued that a Web site posted on the Internet by King
that promoted the Missouri "Blue Note" operated as a basis for
personal jurisdiction over King.91 The court declined to adopt this
position, recognizing that King's sole contact with the State of New
York was the maintenance of a Web site accessible from within
New York.92 The court held that this conduct was insufficient under
due process jurisprudence to grant New York personal jurisdiction
over King. 3
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia in
Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Foundation,94 strongly suggested that
maintenance of a Web site on the Internet by an out-of-state party
would suffice under due process jurisprudence. 5 In Heroes, a
charitable organization located in the District of Columbia sued a
New York charitable organization alleging unfair competition and
trademark infringement. 96 Heroes, Inc. ("Heroes"), argued that the
District of Columbia could exercise personal jurisdiction over
87. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd., 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
88. Bensusan, 937 F Supp. at 301.
89. Id. at 297. Bensusan operated "The Blue Note" jazz club in New York City. Id.
Bensusan also owned the title, rights, and interest to and in "The Blue Note" trademark Id.
King operated a club in Columbia, Missouri, also named "The Blue Note." Id.
90. Id. King filed a motion to dismiss Bensusan's claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
91. Id. The Web site maintained by King was accessible by anyone who had Internet
access. Id. It contained information about King's club, ticketing information, and a schedule
of upcoming events at the club. Id.
92. Id. at 301.
93. Bensusan, 937 F Supp. at 301. The court concluded that King did not intentionally
pursue the benefits of New York. Id. "Creating a site, like placing a product into the stream
of commerce, may be felt nationwide - or even worldwide - but, without more, it is not
an act purposefully directed toward the forum state." Id. The court recognized that King
conducted no business in New York, nor did he encourage residents of New York to access
his site. Id. Mere foreseeability that King's Web site would be accessed by residents of New
York did not suffice to satisfy the requirements of due process. Id.
94. 958 F Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).
95. Heroes, 958 F. Supp. at 5.
96. Id. at 1.
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Heroes Foundation ("Foundation"), because the Foundation
advertised in the Washington Post and maintained a Web site
accessible by residents of the District of Columbia 97  The
Foundation motioned the court to dismiss for a lack of personal
jurisdiction.
98
Denying the Foundation's motion, the court concluded that the
Foundation "purposefully availed itself of the benefits of the
District by maintaining a home page on the Internet."99 Though the
court did not determine whether the site alone would serve as a
basis for personal jurisdiction under a due process analysis, the
court implicitly suggested that it would suffice.' °°
The Internet's influence on personal jurisdiction jurisprudence
was recently addressed by the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania in Zippo Manufacturing. Co. v.
Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.'10  In Zippo, Zippo Mfg. ("Zippo"), a
Pennsylvania corporation, brought an action against Zippo Dot Com
("Dot Corn"), a California corporation, alleging false designation as
well as trademark infringement and dilution.1 °2 Dot Com filed a
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. °3
97. Id. at 6. Heroes Foundation maintained a Web site that permitted users to obtain
information about the Foundation and its members. Id. at 10. The Web site also permitted
interested users to e-mail the Foundation, and it actively solicited donations to the
Foundation. Id. at 11.
98. Id. at 1. Heroes Foundation argued that its Web site was nothing more than a
"passive" site that was "not really targeted at any particular forum." Id. at 11. Furthermore,
Heroes Foundation argued that users could access the Web site only after engaging in
affirmative steps. Id.
99. Id. at 14.
100. Heroes, 958 F Supp. at 14. The court's conclusion that due process permitted the
District of Columbia court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Foundation was based
upon the combined effect of the newspaper advertisements and maintenance of the Web site.
Id. at 13-14. Accordingly, the court did not determine whether the maintenance of a Web site
alone would suffice. Id. at 14. However, the court expressly recognized that it weighed
heavily the existence and use of the Foundation's Web site. Id
101. 952 F Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa 1997).
102. Zippo, 952 F Supp. at 1121. Zippo, a manufacturer of tobacco lighters, maintained
its principal place of business in Bradford, Pennsylvania. Id.
103. Id. Dot Com, a provider of an Internet news service, maintained its principal
place of business in Sunnyvale, California. Id. Dot Corn maintained a Web site that offered
users who accessed the site general information about the Internet News Service, an
application for the service, and advertisements. Id, Dot Corn had no offices, agents, or
employees in Pennsylvania Their offices, Internet servers and employees were located solely
within California. Id. Approximately 3,000 of Dot Corn's 140,000 subscribers were
Pennsylvania residents. Id. These Pennsylvania residents subscribed to the Internet News
Service by filling out an electronic application available through Dot Corn's Web site. Id.
Furthermore, Dot Corn contracted with seven Pennsylvanian Internet access providers to
enable their subscribers to access Dot Corn's Internet news service. Id.
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In concluding that personal jurisdiction could be exercised over
Dot Com, the court recognized that technological advancements
had necessitated the broadening of personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence. 101 The court further recognized that "the permissible
scope of personal jurisdiction based on the Internet use is in its
infant stages."105
The Zippo court noted that personal jurisdiction based on
Internet use has developed along a "sliding scale.'1°  The
out-of-state entities that utilize the Internet to conduct business are
located at one end of the scale whereas the out-of-state entities
that maintain a passive Web site accessible by residents of the
forum State are located at the opposite end of the scale.10 7 Those
out-of-state entities that maintain interactive Web sites in which
users may communicate with the host computer may be found
between the two extremes.08 Although recognizing that entities that
strive to do business with foreign residents have traditionally been
subject to the exercise of personal jurisdiction in the forum States,
the court refused to find a different result "simply because business
is conducted over the Internet."' 9 The court concluded that Dot
Com purposefully availed itself of the benefits of Pennsylvania, and
therefore, was subject to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania." 0
104. Id. at 1123. Quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985),
the court noted, "It is an inescapable fact of modem commercial life that a substantial
amount of commercial business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across
state lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which business is
conducted.
Id.
105. Id. at 1123.
106. Id. at 1124. The court recognized that "the likelihood that personal jurisdiction
can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of
commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet-" Id.
107. Zippo, 952 F Supp. at 1124. The court concluded that if the out-of-state entity
contracts with residents of the forum state and continuously sends computer files over the
Internet to that forum resident, the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be proper. Id.
However, a site which did no more than make available general information to those who
access the site would not suffice under due process jurisprudence; personal jurisdiction
would be improper. Id.
108. Id. Whether or not maintenance of a Web site of this sort would suffice under
contemporary due process jurisprudence depends on "the level of interactivity and
commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site." Id.
109. Id. The court recognized that generally, an entity that purposefully engages in
business outside of its boundaries, may be subject to the exercise of personal jurisdiction by
a foreign jurisdiction. Id.
110. Id. at 1126. The court concluded that Dot Com's conducting of electronic
commerce over the Internet with residents of Pennsylvania constituted "doing business over
the Internet;" it was not merely an advertisement. Id. at 1125. Neither did the court accept
Dot Com's argument that access by Pennsylvania residents of Dot Con's Web site was
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A more recent case, Hearst Corp. v. ARI Goldberger,"' examined
the exercise of personal jurisdiction based on the maintenance of a
Web site. In Hearst, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York considered whether a Web site that
was accessible by New York residents constituted sufficient
contacts with New York to warrant the exercise of personal
jurisdiction."' Hearst asserted that maintenance of the Web site
was sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over Goldberger in
Hearst's trademark infringement claim.113 Goldberger countered by
arguing that personal jurisdiction could not be exercised by the
New York Court solely on the basis of Goldberger's maintenance of
the Web site.
114
The court refused to exercise peisonal jurisdiction, concluding
that to do so would be inconsistent with public policy and
traditional personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.1 5 The court noted
that Goldberger's Web site resembled an advertisement in a
national magazine. 16 Although Goldberger's Web site was accessible
to all Internet users, the court refused to conclude that this fact
alone necessitated the conclusion that Goldberger targeted New
York residents.
1 7
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
exercised personal jurisdiction based largely on the maintenance of
"merely fortuitous." Id. Rather, the court pointed out that Dot Com knowingly and willingly
accepted applications from Pennsylvania residents, as well as transmitted electronic files to
these residents. Id. The court noted that "[i]f Dot Corn had not wanted to be amenable to
jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, the solution would have been simple - it could have chosen
not to sell its services to Pennsylvania residents." Id. at 1126-27. Furthermore, the court
rejected Dot Com's argument that its forum-related conduct was not "numerous or significant
enough," noting that one contact can be sufficient. Id. (citing McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)).
111. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2065 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 26, 1997).
112. Hearst, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *1. Although Goldberger's Web site had been
accessed by New York residents, Goldberger had not sold products or services to any New
York residents. Id. at *14.
113. Id. Hearst, a New York corporation, alleged that Goldberger's Web site
"ESQWIRE.COM" infringed on Hearst's "ESQUIRE" trademark. Id.
114. Id. at *1-2. Goldberger worked in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and resided in
Cherry Hill, New Jersey. Id. at *2. Though the service was not yet operational at the time of
suit, Goldberger's Web site sought to offer "law office infrastructure network services" and
"legal information services" to lawyers. Id. at *1-2.
115. Id. at *2. The court noted that if it exercised personal jurisdiction over
Goldberger, "there would be nationwide (indeed, worldwide) personal jurisdiction over
anyone and everyone who establishes an Internet web site." Id.
116. Id. at *31.
117. Hearst, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *32-35.
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a Web site in Digital Equipment Corp. v. AltaVista Tech. 118 In
Digital, Digital Equipment ("Digital") brought a claim against
AltaVista Technology ("AltaVista"), for trademark infringement and
dilution. as well as unfair competition.119 AltaVista argued that its
maintenance of a Web site that was accessible from within
Massachusetts was not a sufficient contact with Massachusetts to
warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction.120 AltaVista moved to
dismiss Digital's claim for lack of personal jurisdiction. 121
The Digital court concluded that "[w]hen business is transacted
over a computer network via a Web-site accessed by a computer in
Massachusetts, it takes place as much in Massachusetts, literally or
figuratively, as it does anywhere." 22 The court held that AltaVista's
maintenance and use of its Web site for commercial purposes put
AltaVista "over the line," and, thus, Massachusetts had personal
jurisdiction. 123
3. Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause explicitly permits Congress to regulate all
aspects of interstate commerce.124 Implicit in this express grant of
118. 960 F Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997).
119. Digital Equip. Corp., 960 F Supp. at 459.
120. Id. In addition to the maintenance of the Web site, the court noted that AltaVista
contractually agreed to be bound by the laws of Massachusetts, used its Web site to solicit
business from Massachusetts residents, and made three sales to residents of Massachusetts.
Id. at 462, 464.
121. Id. at 459, 461. AltaVista moved to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 472.
122. Id. at 462. The court understood the complexities that the case presented.
On the one hand, it is [sic] troubles me to force corporations that do business over
the Internet, precisely because it is cost-effective, to now factor in the potential costs
of defending against litigation in each and every state; anticipating these costs could
make the maintenance of a Web-based business more expensive. On the other hand, it
is also troublesome to allow those who conduct business on the Web to insulate
themselves against jurisdiction in every state, except in the state (if any) where they
are physically located.
Id. at 471.
123. Id. at 463. The court limited its holding to the facts of the case, noting that it
does not reach the issue of whether any Web activity, by anyone, absent commercial use,
absent advertising and solicitation of both advertising and sales, absent a contract and sales
and other contacts with the forum state, and absent the potentially foreseeable harm of
trademark infringement, would be sufficient to permit the assertion of jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant. While it raises some troubling issues, and while the traditional analyses
must be informed by this new technology, ultimately, this is not the day nor the forum to
resolve them.
Id.
124. Article I provides that "Congress shall have Power... Itlo regulate Commerce
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authority is the understanding that State regulation of interstate
commerce that unduly burdens or discriminates against interstate
commerce is void.125 It is this "dormant" Commerce Clause that has
proven to be the greatest hindrance to the taxation of out-of-state
vendors. 1
26
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,127 the Supreme Court of
the United States shaped contemporary Commerce Clause
jurisprudence with respect to the taxation of interstate commerce.
In Complete Auto, Mississippi imposed a sales tax on Complete
Auto for the privilege of doing business within the State. 128 The
Court concluded that a tax will be upheld "against Commerce
Clause challenge when the tax [1] is applied to an activity with a
substantial nexus with the taxing State, [21 is fairly apportioned, [3]
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly
related to the services provided by the State."
129
Shortly after Complete Auto, the Supreme Court decided
National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization.130 In
National Geographic, California sought to require National
Geographic to collect and remit a use tax imposed on purchases
made by California residents who used the product within
California. 131 The Court held that the California use tax, as applied
to National Geographic's mail-order business, withstood a
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Thbes." U.S. CONST.
art. L, § 8, cls. 1, 3.
125. Although the Commerce Clause grants Congress an affirmative power to regulate
interstate commerce, it "has a negative sweep as well." Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S.
298, 309 (1992) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 231-232, 239 (1824) (Johnson,
J., concurring)). Also referred to as the "negative" Commerce Clause, the dormant Commerce
Clause embodies the belief that the "constitutional grant of power to Congress '[t]o regulate
commerce ... among the several States' (citation omitted) ... implicitly prohibit[s], even in
the absence of Congressional regulation, unduly burdensome or discriminatory State taxation
of transactions or entities engaged in interstate commerce." Orvis v. New York, 654 N.E.2d
954, 956 (N.Y. 1995).
126. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
127. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
128. Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 275. Complete Auto was a Michigan trucking
corporation that transported vehicles to Mississippi dealers on behalf of General Motors
Corporation. Id. at 276.
129. Id. at 279. The Court opined that the proper approach in Commerce Clause
analysis is not to analyze the "formal language of the tax statute but rather its practical
effect." Id. Complete Auto did not allege that the requirements of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence were not satisfied. Id. at 277-78. Rather, Complete Auto alleged that "a tax on
the 'privilege' of engaging in an activity in the State may not be applied to an activity that is
part of interstate commerce." Id. at 278.
130. 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
131. National Geographic Soc'y, 430 U.S. at 553.
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Commerce Clause challenge. 132 In reaching its conclusion, the Court
did not clearly distinguish between the mandates of the Commerce
Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 13 National Geographic argued that it did not have a
sufficient "nexus" with California.134 The Court rejected this
argument, concluding that as long as some "minimum connection"
existed between California and National Geographic, the collection
duty is constitutional. 35
In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, the Court dispelled the belief
that the requirements under the Due Process Clause and the
Commerce Clause were identical.1 36 The Quill Court recognized
132. Id. at 562. National Geographic solicited advertisers for The National Geographic
Magazine from two California offices. Id. at 552. These offices provided no assistance to
National Geographic mail-order business. Id. Rather, all orders were mailed to National
Geographic's headquarters in Washington, D.C. Id. Merchandise was subsequently shipped
from National Geographic offices in either Washington, D.C. or Maryland to residents within
California. Id.
133. Id. at 555-62. The Court opined that the issue presented in National Geographic
was "whether the Society's activities at the offices in California provided sufficient nexus
between the out-of-state seller appellant and the State- as required by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause ... ." Id. Though the Court
concluded that a sufficient nexus existed, the Court did not expressly distinguish between
the two constitutional limitations. Rather, the Court applied a single test - "whether the
facts demonstrate 'some definite link, some minimum connection between [the State and]
the person ... it seeks to tax.'" Id. at 561 (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S.
340, 344-45 (1954)).
134. Id. at 560. National Geographic argued that even if the maintenance of the two
offices would constitute a sufficient nexus between its mail-order business and California,
the two offices would not suffice in this case because the maintenance of the offices was
not related to the mail-order sales. Id. at 560. The Court concluded that National
Geographic's "maintenance of two offices in the State and solicitation by employees assigned
to those offices of advertising copy in the range of $1 million annually" established a
sufficient nexus between National Geographic and California. Id. at 556. However, the Court
disagreed with the California Supreme Court's conclusion that all that is needed to satisfy
the nexus requirement of Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), is a
party's "slightest presence." Id. The Court distinguished Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347
U.S. 340 (1954), from the facts at hand, noting that "[iln addition to the almost total lack of
contacts between Maryland and the Delaware store - Marylanders went to Delaware to
make purchases, the seller did not go to Maryland to make sales - the seller obviously
could not know whether the goods sold over the counter in Delaware were transported to
Maryland prior to their use." Id. at 559. Furthermore, the Court distinguished National Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), overruled in part by Quill Corp.
v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), noting that the only contacts National Bellas Hess had
with Illinois were via the United States mail and common carriers. Id. Unlike the National
Geographic's California offices, the out-of-state vendors in Miller and Bellas Hess had no
physical presence in the taxing state.
135. National Geographic Soc'y, 430 U.S. at 561. The Court noted that the collection
duty need not relate to National Geographic's activities within California as long as there is
"some minimum connection" between California and National Geographic. Id.
136. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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that although the tests to be applied under the Due Process Clause
and the Commerce Clause were similar, "the Clauses pose distinct
limits on the taxing powers of the States."'
37
In Quil, the State of North Dakota sought to require Quill, an
out-of-state vendor, to collect and remit a use tax imposed on
goods purchased through the mail for use in North Dakota 1' The
State of North Dakota argued that the Commerce Clause and the
Due Process Clause had identical nexus requirements.139
Accordingly, North Dakota argued that if the use tax satisfied the
requirements of the Due Process Clause as applied to an
out-of-state vendor, the use tax automatically satisfied the
comparable requirements of the Commerce Clause. 14 The Court
rejected this argument, however, recognizing that the Due Process
and Commerce Clauses focus on different Constitutional
concerns. 
141
The Court noted that the "substantial nexus" requirement of the
Commerce Clause "is not, like due process' 'minimum contacts'
requirement, a proxy for notice, but rather a means for limiting
state burdens on interstate commerce."'4 Recognizing that it had
already eliminated the physical presence requirement of the Due
Process Clause in favor of a more flexible approach, the Court
refused to eliminate the corresponding requirement in the
Commerce Clause.'4
137. Quill, 504 U.S. at 305. The Court noted that "while a State may, consistent with
the Due Process Clause, have the authority to tax a particular taxpayer, imposition of the tax
may nonetheless violate the Commerce Clause." Id. The Court recognized that although the
distinction between the two clauses had not always been expressly maintained, a distinction
did exist. Id.
138. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
139. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
140. Id.
141. Id. The Court noted that "[diespite the similarity in phrasing, the nexus
requirements of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses are not identical." Id. Due process
concerns "fundamental fairness;" whether the out-of-state vendor's contacts with the taxing
state are "substantial enough to legitimate the State's exercise of power over [it]." Id. The
Commerce Clause, by distinction, is concerned with protecting interstate commerce from
suppressive state regulation. Id.
142. Id. at 313. The Court noted that "[a] tax may be consistent with due process and
yet unduly burden interstate commerce." Id. at 313-14, n. 7.
143. Id. at 314-18. Recognizing that the "bright-line rule" of National Bellas Hess v.
Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), advanced the policies and concerns of the
Commerce Clause, the Court opined that such a test would help protect interstate commerce
from undue burdens. Id. at 314-15. The Court further concluded that such a test "firmly
establishes the boundaries of legitimate state authority to impose a duty to collect sales and
use taxes and reduces litigation concerning those taxes." Id. at 315. Additionally, the
bright-line rule "encourages settled expectations and, in doing so, fosters investment by
1998
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Quill teaches that a State may not compel an out-of-state vendor
to collect a use tax on sales made to residents of the taxing State
unless the out-of-state vendor is physically present within the
taxing State. Although the Supreme Court enunciated what
appeared to be a "bright-line" test, post-Quill cases demonstrate
that States have not uniformly interpreted "physical presence."
The New York Court of Appeals specifically addressed the scope
of the "physical presence" requirement in Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals
Tribunal.1' Orvis, a Vermont corporation, sold fishing, camping,
hunting and other outdoor products. 1 Most of Orvis' sales to New
York residents were conducted through its mail-order catalogue. 1
46
However, to facilitate wholesale sales to New York retail
establishments, Orvis employees periodically visited New York.1
47
Orvis argued that New York would have to show that Orvis had a
"substantial" amount of property or people within the State in
order to compel it to collect use taxes.14
The New York Court of Appeals rejected Orvis' argument,
concluding, instead, that Quill does not demand that the
out-of-state vendor have a "substantial physical presence" within
the taxing State. 49 The Court concluded that Quill must not "be
read as equating a substantial physical presence of the vendor in
the taxing State with the substantial nexus prong of the Complete
businesses and individuals." Id. at 316. The Court also opined that adherence to the principle
of stare decisis favored maintaining the bright-line test. Id. at 318. "Stare decisis" is a
principle by which a court will abide by prior determinations of law. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990). In upholding the physical presence requirement of Bellas
Hess, the Court recognized that "contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not
dictate the same result were the issue to arise for the first time today." Quill, 504 U.S. at
311.
144. 654 N.E.2d 954 (N.Y. 1995). The New York Court of Appeals addressed the case of
Vermont Info. Processing, Inc. v. New York at the same cite. Vermont Information
Processing ("VIP"), sold computer hardware and software to New York beverage distributors.
Orvis, 54 N.E.2d. at 955. A majority of VIP's sales to the New York distributors were by
common carrier or the United States mail service. Id. However, VIP employees periodically
traveled to New York to assist the New York distributors in operating the VIP computer
software. Id. at 956.
145. Id. at 955-56. Orvis sold its goods at both wholesale and retail. Id.
146. Id. The goods were shipped from Vermont to buyers via common carrier or the
United States mail service. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 959.
149. Orvis, 654 N.E.2d at 956. The Court of Appeals interpreted Quill "in the context
of its position in the evolution of Supreme Court doctrine limiting the authority of a State to
assess or impose a duty to collect taxes arising out of the economic activity of a foreign
business engaged in interstate commerce." Id.
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Auto test... ."150 Rather, all that is required is that the out-of-state
vendor's physical presence within the taxing State be greater than a
"slightest presence."15 1 Periodic visits to New York by Orvis




The Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the United States
Constitution, though similar, set forth distinct constitutional
requirements. The Due Process Clause is concerned with fairness
and notice, while the Commerce Clause is principled on a national
market unfettered by state regulation.
A. Due Process Clause
Upon review of contemporary due process jurisprudence, it is
evident that little protection exists for the out-of-state vendor that
engages in business through the Internet. As the Court stated in
Quill, physical presence within the taxing jurisdiction is not a
prerequisite under contemporary due process jurisprudence. 15 All
that is required is that "some definite link, some minimum
connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction
it seeks to tax" exist.1M The requisite connection is present if the
out-of-state vendor "purposefully avails" itself of the benefits of the
150. Id. at 959.
151. Id. at 961 (quoting National Geographic v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S.
551, 556 (1997)). The Court concluded that the requirement of a physical presence within the
taxing state can be "manifested by the presence in the taxing State of the vendor's property
or the conduct of economic activities in the taxing State performed by the vendor's
personnel or on its behalf." Id.
152. Id. The Court also concluded that VIP maintained a sufficient physical presence
within New York, thus enabling the State to compel VIP to collect a use tax on sales made
to New York residents. Id. at 962. The record showed that VIP had visited New York at least
41 times during the period in question. Id.
The dissent opined that the majority had misapplied the holding of Quill. Id. at 963
(Bellacosa, J., dissenting). It was the dissent's belief that the "occasional sojourns" of Orvis
and VIP employees into New York did not rise above a "slightest presence." Id. at 966
(Bellacosa, J., dissenting). Nor did the minimal activities of the two parties constitute
"continuous local solicitation" within the State of New York. Id. at 965 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting). The dissent opined that "[diespite their best efforts, [Orvis and VIPI] are now
snagged by the ever-widening net that unsettles expectations, discourages investment and
legitimate interstate commercial intercourse and tears at the mantle of Commerce Clause
protection." Id, at 966 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
153. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992).
154. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 34445 (1954).
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jurisdiction seeking to exercise personal jurisdiction over the
out-of-state vendor. 5
If an out-of-state vendor sells to residents of the taxing State
through the maintenance of a Web site continuously accessible
from within the taxing State, an out-of-state vendor may be
characterized as "doing business over the Internet."5 6 One may
successfully argue that the maintenance of a Web site, through
which residents of the taxing state may order goods from the
out-of-state vendor, is evidence that the out-of-state vendor
"purposefully availed" itself of the taxing State's market. Such a
Web site, which permits users who access it to purchase goods, is
more than an advertisement; it is a solicitation of business. As
such, the out-of-state vendor could be compelled to collect and
remit a use tax to the taxing State.
Accordingly, contemporary due process jurisprudence offers
little, if any, protection to the out-of-state vendor that seeks to
avoid collection and remittance of a use tax imposed by a foreign
State.
B. Commerce Clause
As the Supreme Court of the United States clarified in Quill, the
tests applied by the Due Process and Commerce Clauses are far
from identical. 57 The Due Process Clause no longer requires a
physical presence by the out-of-state vendor within the taxing
State. The Commerce Clause, however, demands such a presence.'l
Maintenance of a Web site on the Internet through which sales
are made by an out-of-state vendor does not constitute a "sufficient
nexus" with the taxing State under contemporary Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. 59 Maintenance of a Web site is no more of a
physical presence within the taxing State than the advertising of a
telephone number in a telephone directory or the mailing of fliers
155. Quil, 504 U.S. at 307.
156. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa 1997); see also
supra notes 101-110 and accompanying text.
157. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992); see also supra notes 55-63
and accompanying text.
158. Quil, 504 U.S. at 317-18.
159. See Gregory A. Ichel, Internet Sounds Death Knell for Use Taxes: States
Continue to Scream over Lost Revenues, 27 SETON HALL L REv. 643, 655 (1997) (concluding
that under contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence, a State may not compel an
out-of-state vendor to collect a use tax on sales made through the Internet to residents of
the taxing State where the only contact the out-of-state vendor has with the taxing State is
the maintenance of a Web site accessible from within that State).
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to residents of the taxing State.160 Some courts have opined that the
continuous presence of a Web Site on the Internet differentiates the
Internet from print media, however, such reasoning is flawed.
16 1
The mere presence of a Web site on the Internet does not create a
presumption of physical presence anymore than the printing of a
toll-free number within a local phone directory The Web site may
constitute a solicitation of business within the taxing State,
however, it does not constitute a physical presence within the
taxing State.
162
Until the United States Congress determines that the effective
and efficient operation of the American economy no longer
demands Commerce Clause protection from the imposition of use
taxes on out-of-state vendors, vendors may refuse to engage in use
tax collection. It is apparent that the Supreme Court will not alter
the current physical presence requirement adopted in Quill.
16
Instead, the Court has invited Congress to determine the best
interests of the American economy and legislate accordingly.
1
Until Congress accepts the Supreme Court's invitation,
contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence will protect
out-of-state vendors from the required collection of use taxes on
sales made over the Internet to residents of the taxing State.
65
160. See Karl A. Frieden & Michael E. Porter, The Taxation of Cyberspace: State Tax
Issues Related to the Internet and Electronic Commerce, 11 STATE TAx NOTES 1363, 1385
(1996) (recognizing that "Web sites are arguably . . . electronic advertising or intangible
property.").
161. See, e.g., Inset Systems v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F Supp. 161 (D.Conn. 1996);
see also supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
162. This Comment is based on the assumption that the only contact the out-of-state
vendor has with the taxing State is the maintenance of a Web site that is accessible from
within the taxing State.
163. The Court noted that its decision to maintain the physical presence demarcation
between the Due Process and Commerce Clauses was based in part on "the fact that the
underlying issue is not only one that Congress may be better qualified to resolve, but also
one that Congress has the ultimate power to resolve." Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S.
298, 318 (1992). The Court further recognized that "[n]o matter how we evaluate the burdens
that use taxes impose on interstate commerce, Congress remains free to disagree with our
conclusions." Id.
164. See Ichel, supra note 159, at 662-63 (concluding that the United States Congress
must enact legislation with respect to the State's authority to compel out-of-state vendors to
collect and remit use taxes.).
165. But see Adam L. Schwartz, Note, Nexus or Not? Orvis v. New York, SFA Folio v.
Thcy and the Persistent Confusion over Quill, 29 CoNN. L REv. 485, 487 (1996) (stating that
because "[n]either the Congress, nor the states acting in concert, can produce the kind of tax
regime that will provide a set of settled expectations under which business competition may
adequately take place," the Supreme Court of the United States must enunciate a "bright line
rule" which governs collection and remittance of use taxes by out-of-state vendors).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Taxation of Internet sales will continue to be a hotly debated
topic in the coming months and years.'66 As States continue to seek
new ways to increase revenue, out-of-state vendors will become
prey to the sly legislature. Presently, out-of-state vendors selling
over the Internet escape use tax duties because the Commerce
Clause requires a physical presence within the taxing jurisdiction.
However, this constitutional requirement will survive only as long
as Congress continues to believe that such a requirement is vital to
the preservation of interstate commerce.'
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166. See Grierson, supra note 2, at 576 (opining that "the nexus hurdle is an
all-important one for state tax administrators to impose a tax" and that "we're going to see a
lot of interesting battles here in the future over the issue."). see also R. Scot Grierson, State
Taxation of the Information Superhighway: A Proposal for Taxation of Information
Services, 16 Loy. L-A ENT. LJ. 603, 665 (1996) (recognizing that "we have hardly scratched the
surface of an ongoing nexus debate."); Frieden, supra note 4, at 1389 (opining that "[niexus
issues, as they relate to electronic commerce, will undoubtedly be a major topic of
discussion in state taxation throughout the next decade."); Thomas Steele, Nexus at the
Dawn of the Electronic Commerce Revolution, 12 STATE TAx NOTEs 1073, 1073 (1997) (noting
that the "question[] of whether and how state and local governments may tax electronic
commerce ... [is] among today's most controversial state and local tax issues").
167. As of the writing of this Comment, bills were pending in both the United States
House of Representatives and the Senate which would create a three-year moratorium on
new Internet taxation. Known as the "Internet Tax Freedom Act," this legislation would
"establish a national policy against State and local interference with interstate commerce on
the Internet or online services. . . and.., exercise congressional jurisdiction over interstate
commerce by establishing a moratorium on the imposition of exactions that would interfere
with the free flow of commerce via the Internet. . . ." Internet Tax Freedom Act, H.R. 3529,
105th Cong. (1998). The House version of the bill has already gained the endorsement of
President Clinton, the National Governors Association, the National League of Cities, and the
United States Council of Mayors. David Einstein, 3-Year Ban on Internet Tax Backed, SAN
FRANcIsco CHRoNmcLE, Mar. 20, 1998, at BI. The bill recognizes that the new challenges the
Internet presents are best addressed through Congressional action:
(10) A consistent and coherent national policy regarding taxation of electronic
commerce conducted over the Internet, and the concomitant uniformity, simplicity,
and fairness that is needed to avoid burdening this evolving form of interstate and
foreign commerce, can best be achieved by the United States exercising its authority
under Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States Constitution to encourage a
cooperative solution among Federal, State, and local levels of government.
H.R. 3529 § 2(10). During the three-year moratorium, "neither any state nor any political
subdivision thereof shall impose, assess, collect, or attempt to collect any of the following
specified taxes: . . . (6) discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce." H.R. 3529 § 3(a)(6).
The Act defines "electronic commerce" as "any transaction comprising the sale, offer, or
delivery of goods or services (including Internet access and online services) via the Internet."
H.R. 3529 § 9(4).
The Act is an effort to protect Internet commerce from the estimated 30,000 federal, state
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and local taxing jurisdictions. Internet Tax Freedom Act, H.R. 1054, 105th Cong. § 2(7)
(1997). Whether the Act will become law, and what effect it will have, is yet to be seen.
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